Commentary on how the Courts have interpreted the Health and Safety (Display Screen Equipment) Regulations and associated guidance in Judgments in personal injury claims for WRULDs

The views expressed in this commentary are those of the webmaster alone and do not necessarily reflect HSE policy. This site does not provide legal advice or seek to interpret the civil or criminal law. Visitors are strongly advised to consult a suitably qualified specialist for professional advice.

Introduction

1. The Health and Safety (Display Screen Equipment) Regulations 1992, (View Statutory Instrument) which came into force on the 1st January 1993, were amended by the Health and Safety (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2002, ( View Statutory Instrument) which came into force on the 17th September 2002.

2. Guidance on the Health and Safety (Display Screen Equipment) Regulations was first published by the HSE in November 1992: Display Screen Equipment Work. Health and Safety (Display Screen Equipment) Regulations 1992 Guidance on Regulations L26; together with a new version of the leaflet Working with VDUs. In July 1994, the HSE published VDUs an Easy Guide to the Regulations.

3. After the Health & Safety (Display Screen Equipment) Regulations 1992 were amended by the Health and Safety (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2002, revised guidance was published by the HSE in February 2003: Work with display screen equipment Health & Safety (Display Screen Equipment) Regulations 1992 as amended by the Health and Safety (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2002. L26 (download a free copy of L26 from the HSE's web site) and The law on VDUs An easy guide. HSG90 (download a free copy of HSG90 from the HSE's web site).

Interpretations

4. Even though the Health & Safety (Display Screen Equipment) Regulations (hereafter referred to as the DSE Regulations) have been in force for over 15 years there have been relatively few personal injury claims for WRULDs in which the DSE Regulations have been of significance, either in terms of the outcome of the case or the interpretation of some regulation or guidance. There are many issues of interpretation that have yet to be examined in the Courts. Alleged breaches of regulations 2, 4, 6 & 7 appear to be most commonly addressed in Judgments, with the requirements of regulation 4 producing the most disparate interpretations.

5. While the individual regulations require duty holders to take distinct actions there are explicit interactions between certain regulations, e.g. regulation 7 requires information to be provided about the measures taken to comply with other regulations. Thus, compliance with regulation 4, whatever that may require, would not necessarily prevent a finding of a breach of statutory duty with respect to the daily work routine, if inadequate information had been provided about breaks and changes of activity.

6. Claims are phrased in pleadings in terms of alleged breaches of individual regulations and/or allegations of negligence. However, it is sometimes unclear from Judgments, particularly County Court Judgments, whether the findings with respect to a particular issue relate to negligence and/or to a breach of statutory duty, and if the latter, to precisely which part of which regulation the findings apply (see for example Lacey - v - Shropshire Career Service and Simpson - v - Dunham Bush Ltd). Issues and areas considered in Judgments can refer to duties under the DSE Regulations without specifying particular regulations or to the specific requirements of one or more parts of one or more of the individual regulations.

7. Thus, when considering how the Courts have interpreted the DSE Regulations and associated guidance in Judgments in personal injury claims for WRULDs, it is expedient to focus on the liability issues that are addressed in Court Judgments rather than simply comment on the individual regulations in numeric order. However, it is also interesting to note the issues and areas potentially raised by the individual regulations within the DSE Regulations that the Courts have, so far, not addressed.

Who and what are covered by the DSE Regulations?

8. Regulation 1 of the DSE Regulations determines whether all the other regulations are applicable. If an employee is not deemed to be a 'user' or if the equipment involved is not deemed to be 'display screen equipment' or if the assembly of furniture and equipment involved is not deemed to be a 'workstation', within the meaning of regulation 1, the DSE Regulations are of no consequence, though the requirements of other Regulations such as the Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations and the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations may still need to be considered.

9. So far, few Judgments in personal injury claims for WRULDs have addressed the circumstances in which the DSE Regulations apply, but it appears inevitable that the various aspects of applicability will be tested in the Courts in the future, when suitable cases emerge. The glaring anomaly that particularly affects multi-national companies and that may become worthy of judicial consideration at some point is the variation in the applicability of such health and safety regulations in different Member States.

10. In implementing EU Directive 90/270/EEC into their national health and safety regulations some Member States chose to define a 'user' simply in terms of the number of hours of DSE use per day or per week. For example, in Italy the equivalent of a 'user' was defined as a worker who habitually and systematically uses display screen equipment for at least four hours consecutively, excluding rest pauses, for the entire working week. This is referred to as the applicability threshold of the legislation.

11. In the Czech Republic, the regulations have to be applied in all establishments where any employees work at least 4 hours per day at display screen equipment. In Denmark and the Netherlands the applicability threshold is 2 hours. In Germany and Finland there is no defined minimum duration of VDU work. There, the legislation applies to all employees doing a "significant part" of their normal work at a display screen unit. Like Germany and Finland, the UK simply adopted the definition in the Directive.

12. No known Judgment in a personal injury claim for a WRULD has turned on, or even addressed, the issue of what is actually meant by the phrase "an employee who habitually uses display screen equipment as a significant part of his normal work". In part, this may be due to the comprehensive guidance on 'who is a user' that appears in the HSE's guidance on the DSE Regulations.

13. No known Judgment in a personal injury claim for a WRULD has turned on, or even addressed, the issues of whether the equipment implicated is deemed to be 'display screen equipment' or if the assembly of furniture and equipment involved is deemed to be a 'workstation', within the meaning of the DSE Regulations.

14. Explicit references to the applicability of the DSE Regulations are to be found in only a small proportion of the Judgments. For example, the County Court Judgment in May 1999 in McPherson - v - London Borough of Camden refers to the "Regulations that define a 'workstation' to include an assembly comprising display screen equipment and any disk drive, modem, printer, work chair or work desk. Clearly, Mrs McPherson's desk, chair, computer equipment including its keyboard and printer were a 'workstation' within that definition". In the County Court Judgment in August 2008 in Wells-Cockburn -v- The Bristol Debt Advice Centre and another the Judge was satisfied that "a word processing operator, a secretary ......... would almost certainly without doubt be regarded as a user".

15. In most cases it is common ground whether or not the Claimant's work is covered by the DSE Regulations. For example, in the County Court and Court of Appeal Judgments in 2008 in Goodwin (now Slevin) - v - Bennetts UK Ltd there was no dispute the DSE Regulations applied, even though the Claimant only made in the region of 10,000 keystrokes per day.

16. Occasionally, the issue is raised in the pleadings, but not pursued at trial. For example, in Donnellan - v - Halifax Building Society in November 1999, whether or not the Claimant was a "user" within the meaning of the DSE Regulations was potentially a matter for the Court to decide. However, at trial, it was conceded by Counsel for the Claimant that the Claimant was not a "user" within the meaning of the DSE Regulations, due to the limited use she made of DSE while working as a mortgage adviser.

17. However, in Donnellan - v - Halifax Building Society the Claimant had also pleaded a breach of regulation 5 of the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1992. It was alleged that a short cable caused the keyboard to be offset to her right as the Claimant undertook a mortgage interview, which meant that to use the keyboard the Claimant's hand was in ulnar deviation. It was contended that this abnormal position of the hand was responsible for the Claimant's De Quervain's Syndrome. The Judge found that the Claimant's workstation was "suitable and sufficient in terms of its positioning" and that there was no breach of statutory duty.

Risk assessments

18. An alleged failure to undertake a suitable and sufficient risk assessment, as required by regulation 2 of the DSE regulations, is alleged in nearly all personal injury claims for WRULDs associated with DSE use and frequently proves fatal to the defence of a claim, with respect to liability. It is most commonly alleged that there was a failure to undertake any timely risk assessment, rather than that the risk assessment that was undertaken was not suitable or sufficient.

19. In the absence of evidence that a timely risk assessment was undertaken, a breach of regulation 2 is usually fairly clear and attention is often focused in the Judgments on what a suitable and sufficient risk assessment would or should have found and/or on whether the absence of a timely risk assessment caused or materially contributed to an alleged injury. Such matters rely upon the Judge's evaluation of the evidence and findings of fact in the particular case.

20. For example, in the County Court Judgment on the 19th May 1999 in the case of McPherson - v - London Borough of Camden, His Honour Judge Thornton QC took the view that had a statutory assessment been made in June 1993, Mrs McPherson would have been advised: that she should use a wrist rest and a flat keyboard; that she should resort to an appropriate posture, which would have been demonstrated, whilst using the keyboard; that she should take regular breaks from the keyboard, of an uninterrupted length of at least 10 minutes every hour; and that she should not use the keyboard for a total of more than 50% of the working day.

21. In the County Court Judgment on the 9th February 2001, in the case of Gallagher - v - Bond Pearce, HH Judge Tyzack found that the Health and Safety audit undertaken by the Defendant in December 1992, which the Defendant felt was required in anticipation of the coming into force of the DSE Regulations, was "manifestly inadequate". In particular, the Defendant failed to ensure that prior to the audit the Claimant was given any training, a specific requirement of regulation 6 of the DSE Regulations, and which in his judgment was an absolutely essential prerequisite to the completion of any checklist. HH Judge Tyzac was quite satisfied that the Claimant herself had no idea at all that this audit was purporting to be a risk assessment carried out pursuant to the DSE Regulations.

22. HH Judge Tyzac also found that there was no adequate regard to urgency so far as the identified action was concerned. The document holder was not provided until nearly 12 months later and the footrest sometime after that. HH Judge Tyzac considered that this was inconsistent with the guidance on the DSE Regulations which suggested that if an assessment of a work station showed there was a risk to the user, the employer should take immediate steps to reduce the risk.

23. In the case of Hadoulis - v - Trinatours Ltd in October 2002, it was admitted that no analyses of the workstation had been carried out, in breach of regulation, 2 but this was found to be not causative of any injury. The Judge also suggested that a complaint about the comfort and state of a chair would rest on a breach of regulation 3, a breach of regulation 2 only being relevant if compliance with it would have resulted in a different course of action.

24. The Courts clearly consider that competently performed risk assessments are important and should be acted upon and not simply performed, filed away and forgotten. See, for example, Fifield - v - Denton Hall / Denton Wilde Sapte in which the Court of Appeal found that the Judge at first instance was manifestly entitled to find that the Defendant regarded the whole risk assessment process as "an unfortunate waste of time".

25. An interesting area that is not explicitly addressed in current HSE guidance on the DSE Regulations, and which no known Judgment has so far considered, is whether the completion of an on-line checklist constitutes a suitable and sufficient risk assessment. While the HSE's guidance suggests that "Recorded assessments need not necessarily be a pencil and paper record but can be stored electronically", the question is whether assessments can be completed electronically by the employee rather than be performed by the employer. Unlike other regulations that require that every employer shall ensure that something is done, regulation 2(1) explicitly states that every employer shall perform a suitable and sufficient analysis.

26. No known Judgment in a personal injury claim for a WRULD has turned on, or even addressed, the issue of who is responsible for undertaking a risk assessment when an employee is using another employer's workstation.

27. No known Judgment in a personal injury claim for a WRULD has turned on, or even addressed, the issue of what is required in terms of risk assessments when an employee is using DSE at other than a conventional office workstation, e.g. when hot-desking or when using a lap-top at home or in a hotel.

Requirements for workstations

28. Regulation 3 on the 'Requirements for workstations' refers to the Schedule to the DSE Regulations which sets out the minimum requirements for display screen workstations, covering the equipment, the working environment, and the interface between the computer and the user. The wording of the Schedule to the DSE Regulations is very similar to that in the Annex to EU Directive 90/270/EEC, from which the DSE Regulations are derived. The Annex was originally written in French and unfortunately became the subject of political horse-trading between Member States, resulting in a bizarre mixture of significant and trivial ergonomic issues, expressed very badly.

29. Many of the so-called 'Minimum requirements for workstations' contained in the Schedule to the DSE Regulations intermingle desirable welfare provisions with questionable, in places unintelligible, requirements, which have dubious relevance to health and safety. Annex A of the guidance published in November 1992 contained information on "those requirements of the Schedule which call for some interpretation", while Appendix 1 of the guidance published in February 2003 is said to contain "more information on those parts of the Schedule which may need interpretation".

30. Given the acknowledged scope for misinterpreting the Schedule and the less than clear wording of the extent to which employers must ensure that workstations meet the requirements laid down in the Schedule, Judgments in personal injury claims for WRULDs might be expected to have devoted considerable attention to regulation 3 and to the requirements for workstations. In fact, remarkably few Judgments have explicitly addressed an alleged breach of regulation 3. Potentially contentious requirements, such as The seat back shall be adjustable in both height and tilt, and problematic areas, such as the principles of software ergonomics must be applied, have not, so far, attracted any attention in the Courts.

31. In the County Court Judgment in the case of Hadoulis - v - Trinatours Ltd in October 2002, the Judge questioned whether providing a chair that was not comfortable for an employee amounted to a breach of regulation 3 by reference to paragraph 2( e) of the Schedule (requiring the chair to allow "easy freedom of movement and a comfortable position").

32. The Judge found that there was no breach regulation 3 in that, apart from the brief times when out of adjustment, it was, objectively, a suitable chair for the use to which the Claimant put it: it was stable and allowed the user easy freedom of movement. He interpreted the regulation as being concerned with whether the chair allowed a comfortable position in the sense that it was possible to position the chair so that the user was in an appropriate, or suitable, position to carry out her task and was not required to adopt a position which, for instance, required her to adopt a distorted posture. It may not have been a chair in which the Claimant was comfortable, perhaps in any position, but the Claimant may not have been comfortable in any chair given her persistent back pain.

33. In the case of Trotman - v - London Borough of Tower Hamlets in September 2002, it was admitted that the Claimant was working in a small cramped room at an unsuitable table with a rigid chair, which was not capable of being adjusted in breach of regulation 3 of the DSE Regulations.

34. In the County Court Judgment on the 18th November 2004 in the case of Routledge - v - Woolworths plc, one of the issues was where on the workstation the monitor should have been located. Even though the Claimant alleged breaches of the DSE Regulations, there was no suggestion in the Judgment that there was any breach of regulation 3. HH Judge Sennitt found that there was a breach of the common law duty of care in the wrongful placing of the Claimant's monitor to the right of her desk instead of in front of the Claimant and in thereafter making matters worse by moving the screen yet further to the right. The Judgment refers to the drawing on page 32 of the HSE's 1992 guidance, which is headed "Subjects dealt with in the Schedule" and which shows a monitor and keyboard off-set to the right. However, HH Judge Sennitt took the view that this drawing was never intended to give advice on seating and posture for typical office tasks.

35. In the County Court Judgment in November 2001 in the case of Wall - v - Bartlett Construction Group Ltd the positioning of the screen at a angle of about 45 degrees was found to be neither negligent nor in breach of regulations, however, the only regulation referred to in this context was regulation 2(3). The Judgment notes that even though there is a mass of requirements and recommendations about the workstation in the Schedule to the DSE Regulations and in guidance documentation generally, there is a complete silence about the horizontal positioning of the screen (i.e. central as opposed to one side). It is suggested that given the extent of guidance on almost everything else, it can only be assumed that this is because it is not thought that positioning to one side involves any risk to health.

Work routine

36. In an early interpretation of the requirements of regulation 4, in the County Court Judgment on the 17th June 1997 in Westray - v - Midland Bank plc, HH Judge Eaglestone agreed with the Defendant's proposition that the HSE's guidance is "simply a guidance and imposes no duty on employers to give breaks of any particular frequency or interval" and found the Defendants were not in breach of regulation 4.

37. As already noted, in the County Court Judgment on the 19th May 1999 in the case of McPherson - v - London Borough of Camden, His Honour Judge Thornton QC took the view that had a statutory assessment been made in June 1993, Mrs McPherson would have been advised, among other things, to take regular breaks from the keyboard, of an uninterrupted length of at least 10 minutes every hour, and that she should not use the keyboard for a total of more than 50% of the working day, given that "Mrs McPherson was a middle-aged female who had never used a keyboard previously, save for very occasional one-off usage in the immediately preceding period".

38. In another early interpretation of the requirements of regulation 4, in the County Court Judgment in Binns - v - Speechly Bircham on the 3rd July 1997, HH Judge Rich took the view that the regulation is to apply to all those who engage in work using display screen equipment as a significant part of their normal work. If such significant use places the employee in no danger of injury to health or safety, it cannot be a proper construction of regulation 4 that nonetheless the employer is obliged to reduce the workload.

39. HH Judge Rich thought that the regulation meant no more than a plan must be produced such that the work at the equipment is periodically interrupted either by such breaks, or by such changes of activity as reduce the employees workload at the equipment. He thought that that understanding was in conformity with the guidance, which he described as having "no force at all in the construction of the regulation", but of considerable assistance in explaining the context of the circumstances of employment with which the regulation is concerned. HH Judge Rich found that the ordinary course of the Plaintiff's work, in spite of the fact that the majority of her time was in front of the VDU, did not involve uninterrupted periods of work exclusively at the screen. There were therefore changes of activity which reduced her workload at the equipment.

40. In the case of Horridge & Roberts - v - Gan Insurance Co Ltd in September 2001, HH Judge Brunning was satisfied, having considered the regulations and the nature of the Claimants' employment, that the Defendants were not required to institute a regime of rest breaks and pauses in order to discharge their statutory duty to the Claimants. The nature of the work was so widely varied, and natural breaks occurred so frequently within it, that there was no negligence.

41. In the County Court Judgment in November 2001 in the case of Wall - v - Bartlett Construction Group Ltd it is suggested that it is not a sufficient discharge of the employer's duty, to plan under that regulation, to leave the matter entirely in the hands of the employee and content himself merely with not forbidding breaks. The employer must be alert to the possibility that the circumstances are such (whether because of work culture, volume of work or whatever) that breaks are not being taken and workload is not being reduced. He must then intervene and be more pro-active in seeing that the objectives (of work interruption and reduction) are achieved.

42. In the County Court Judgment on the 9th February 2001, in the case of Gallagher - v - Bond Pearce, HH Judge Tyzack found that the Defendants did not apply their minds adequately to the necessity for rest breaks and found the Defendant to be in breach of regulation 4.

43. In the case of Horridge & Roberts - v - Gan Insurance Co Ltd in September 2001, the County Court Judge was satisfied, having considered the regulations and the nature of the Claimants' employment, that the Defendants were not required to institute a regime of rest breaks and pauses in order to discharge their statutory duty to the Claimants, given that the work was so widely varied and that natural breaks occurred so frequently within it.

44. The County Court Judge in the case of Hadoulis - v - Trinatours Ltd, in October 2002, considered that there had been no breach of regulation 4, at any time, even though it was admitted that the Defendant failed "positively to make such plans", given that appropriate interruptions by breaks or changes in activity were inherent and in fact took place.

45. In case involving a legal secretary, that of Fifield - v - Denton Hall / Denton Wilde Sapte, in the Judgment at first instance on the 22nd March 2005, HH Judge Reid QC agreed with the suggestion that if the Claimant's job was such that she was unable to take a break from continuous keyboard work of about five minutes per hour, then steps should have been taken to ensure that she could. HH Judge Reid QC found, among other things, that Mrs Fifield's working practices would have been materially altered if she had been properly trained and had risk assessments been performed competently and with proper frequency. On balance, the likelihood was that she would have ensured that her typing was spread throughout the working day and was not concentrated in the morning and early afternoon; she would have taken regular breaks from typing in every hour; and that she would have ensured that her breaks did not involve pressured manual tasks.

46. In the Judgment of the Court of Appeal on the 8th March 2006, Lord Justice Wall was of the view that the findings of HH Judge Reid QC clearly established a breach of regulation 4 and that Mrs Fifield was very much left to her own devices.

47. In the Court of Appeal Judgment in Goodwin (now Slevin) - v - Bennetts UK Ltd the Defendant was found to be in breach of regulation 4 of the DSE Regulations, but that the breach had no causative effect, given that if the Defendant had set about devising a plan as required by regulation 4, such a plan would not have required any material change to the Claimant's existing routine. From a lay perspective, this interpretation of regulation 4 raises questions about what an employer has to do to demonstrate compliance with regulation 4 if, in devising a plan to comply with regulation 4, finds that such a plan does not require any material change to the existing routine.

The provision of information and training

48. As already noted, in the County Court Judgment on the 9th February 2001, in the case of Gallagher - v - Bond Pearce, HH Judge Tyzack found that the Health and Safety audit undertaken by the Defendant in December 1992 was "manifestly inadequate" in that the Defendant failed to ensure that prior to the audit the Claimant was given any training, which HH Judge Tyzac considered was an "absolutely essential prerequisite" to the completion of any checklist. HH Judge Tyzac was quite satisfied that the Claimant herself had no idea at all that the audit was purporting to be a risk assessment carried out pursuant to the DSE Regulations.

49. HH Judge Tyzack also refers to an information pack relating to the DSE Regulations as "very important documents", which purported to show that they had complied with regulation 7 of the DSE Regulations. HH Judge Tyzack goes on to suggest that, bearing in mind its importance, a degree of formality as to its circulation would be expected of a prudent employer. For example, handed individually to each relevant employee with a short verbal explanation as to what it was, and that it was important for its contents to be read and understood, and for any questions about it to be directed to a particular person. He could envisage a prudent employer requiring those who had received the pack to indicate by signature or initials that each had done so.

50. In the County Court Judgment in the case of Hadoulis - v - Trinatours Ltd in October 2002, it was admitted that the Defendant failed to provide the Claimant with appropriate health and safety training and information, in breach of regulations 6 and 7. However, the Judge found that even if those regulations had been complied with, the Claimant's problems would have been no different.

51. In Binns - v - Speechly Bircham in July 1997, HH Judge Rich found the Defendant not to have been in breach of regulations 4 and 6 of the DSE Regulations, but in breach of regulation 7(2) in not providing information to the Plaintiff as to the planning of her daily work routine. HH Judge Rich took the view that if the obligation under regulation 7(2) had been complied with so that the Plaintiff had been informed that the employer both had a duty to plan her activities so as to ensure interruptions in her workload at the equipment, and had been told that the plan of the employer was that she should use the changes of activities which were inevitable in order to ensure a proper pattern of interruption, her approach to her work would have been different. HH Judge Rich went on to find that the breach of regulation 7(2) was sufficiently causative of the injury that the Plaintiff suffered as to render the Defendant liable in damages.

52. In the case of Trotman - v - London Borough of Tower Hamlets in September 2002, the Defendant admitted breaches of regulations 6 and 7 of the DSE Regulations. HH Judge Dean found that the Defendant failed, in breach of regulations 6 and 7 of the DSE Regulations and regulations 8 and 9 of the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations, to provide the Claimant with any health or safety training or instruction. Had they done so, the Claimant would at least have been in the position to be aware of the risks she was facing and perhaps have taken some steps to order her own activities with a view to reducing those risks. However, that would not have relieved the Defendants of their primary duty to ensure compliance with the regulations.

53. In the Judgment of the Court of Appeal in March 2006, in the case of Fifield - v - Denton Hall / Denton Wilde Sapte, Lord Justice Wall upheld the finding of HH Judge Reid QC at first instance, who had concluded that the admitted breach of regulation 6 was causative of Mrs Fifield's injuries. HH Judge Reid QC had found that Mrs. Fifield's working practices would have been materially altered if she had been properly trained and had risk assessments been performed competently and with proper frequency. On balance: she would have ensured that her typing was spread throughout the working day and was not concentrated in the morning and early afternoon; she would have taken regular breaks from typing in every hour; she would have ensured that her breaks did not involve pressured manual tasks; she would have told the Defendant of the intermittent symptoms she experienced during 1998; and the risk of injury from the increase in work load would have been identified and her workload would have been managed so as to reduce the quantity of typing and the ensuing document collation that was required. Further, in the knowledge of her wrist pains, it is more likely than not that other secretarial help would have been enlisted.

54. In the Judgment of the Court of Appeal in December 2008, in the case of Goodwin (now Slevin) - v - Bennetts UK Ltd, Lord Justice Jackson found that the Defendant at no time complied with its obligation under regulations 6 and 7 to provide information and training to the Claimant about how to use her workstation without suffering personal injury, but that prior to the Claimant developing symptoms and going off work, even if the Defendant had provided proper training and information, no-one would have expected the Claimant's moderate use of the keyboard to be causing personal injury.

55. However, Lord Justice Jackson went on to find that after the Claimant returned to work the position was transformed. If the Defendant had provided proper information and training to the Claimant, it would at once have become apparent that the Claimant's keyboard use needed to be further reduced. Lord Justice Jackson concluded that the Defendant's breaches of regulations 6 and 7 caused a recurrence of the Claimant's symptoms and that if the Defendant had provided proper information and training, the Claimant's keyboard use would have been substantially reduced and the recurrence of symptoms would not have occurred.

Conclusions

56. No clear picture emerges from the available Judgments in personal injury claims for WRULDs about how the Courts have interpreted the individual regulations within the DSE Regulations. Many issues of interpretation have yet to be examined in the Courts. In the relatively few cases in which the Courts have examined the requirements of these regulations, the interpretations appear to be inconsistent.

57. There appears to be no evidence to suggest that any individual regulation within the DSE Regulations has caused a claim to succeed that in the absence of the Regulations would have failed, given that findings of beaches of the regulations usually go hand in hand with findings of negligence. However, comparing claims associated with DSE use with claims associated other types of work suggests the effects of the DSE Regulations may be more insidious.

58. The existence of the DSE Regulations appears to have given, or at least reinforced, the perception that even the moderate use of display screen equipment gives rise to a foreseeable risk of injury, despite the fact that the HSE's guidance has consistently suggested that the risks to typical users are low. Moreover, in claims associated with DSE use attention often appears to be focused on the minutiae of the system of work and DSE users often appear to be regarded as entirely lacking in initiative and in need of information and training about issues that many would regard as common sense. Overall, the Judgments give the impression that the Courts often expect less of DSE users than they do of other employees, while expecting more of the employers of DSE users than they do of other employers.

59. Take for example the case of Summers - v - Justica Cas Limited in September 1997, in which the Claimant spent at least 75%-80% of her working day on an adding machine. The Judge did not accept that the Defendant had a duty to design or enforce a lay-out of an office desk indicating where an adding machine should be put, or how far in a chair should be pulled up, or whether an operator should sit up straight or lean forward. In his judgement, it was excessive to impose a duty of that kind on an employer, and an office worker could reasonably be expected to make her own judgment about such matters. Would the same have been said had Miss Summers been using display screen equipment rather than an adding machine?

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